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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND EXECUTIVE 
POWER—INTERPRETING AND IMPLEMENTING 
INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS 
Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) 
 
I. FACTS 
In 1994, Jose Ernando Medellín, a Mexican national, was convicted of 
capital murder and sentenced to death in a Texas state court for the gang 
rapes and murders of two Houston teenagers.1  The rapes and subsequent 
murders took place on June 24, 1993.2  Medellín was arrested five days 
later, on June 29, at approximately 4:30 a.m.3  Following the arrest, local 
law enforcement officers gave Medellín Miranda warnings, but failed to 
advise him of his Vienna Convention right to seek assistance from the 
Mexican consul and to notify the Mexican consulate of his detention.4  A 
few hours later, Medellín gave a detailed written confession.5  Medellín was 
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.6 
In 1997, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction 
and sentence.7  Medellín subsequently filed a state application for post-
conviction relief with the state trial court, arguing his conviction and sen-
tence should be vacated as a remedy for the violation of his Vienna Con-
vention rights.8  The trial court denied relief, finding the claim concerning 
Medellín’s Vienna Convention rights to be procedurally defaulted, as Me-
dellín did not raise the claim at trial or on direct appeal.9  The trial court 
 
1. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1354 (2008). 
2. Id.  At the time of the crime, Medellín was a member of the “Black and Whites” gang. Id.  
To prevent the victims from identifying the gang members who took part in the rapes, Medellín 
personally murdered at least one of the girls by strangling her with her own shoelace. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id.  Although Medellín had lived in the United States most of his life, he was still a na-
tional of Mexico.  Id.; see also Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, Medellín v. Texas, No. 06-984 (June 28, 
2007) (stating that Medellín told the arresting officers he was born in Mexico and informed the 
Harris County Pretrial Services he was not a citizen of the United States). 
5. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1354. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id.; see also Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, or “Redressabil-
ity,” After Danforth v. Minnesota:  Why Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect on New Constitu-
tional Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 63 (2009) (explaining 
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also rejected the claim on the merits, holding Medellín failed to show actual 
prejudice arising from the alleged Vienna Convention violation.10  The 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.11  In 2001, Medellín filed a peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas.12  The district court denied the petition stating 
Medellín’s Vienna Convention claim was procedurally defaulted.13 The dis-
trict court further held Medellín had failed to show that any alleged viola-
tion of his Vienna Convention rights impacted the validity of his conviction 
and sentence.14  Medellín appealed.15 
In 2003, Mexico initiated proceedings against the United States before 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on behalf of fifty-one Mexican na-
tionals, including Medellín.16  The International Court of Justice issued its 
decision in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals17 while 
Medellín’s application for a certification of appealability was still pending 
in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.18  The ICJ held that by failing to in-
form the fifty-one Mexican nationals of their Vienna Convention rights, the 
United States violated Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention.19  Accor-
dingly, the ICJ held that the United States was obligated to provide, by 
means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions 
 
that the procedural default rule prohibits a party from raising claims in post conviction 
proceedings that “could or should have been raised on direct review”). 
10. Id. at 1354-55. 
11. Id. at 1355. 
12. Id. (citing Medellín v. Cockrell, Civ. Action No. H-01-4078 (S.D. Tex. June 26, 2003)). 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 1352-53.  The ICJ is the primary judicial organ of the United Nations. Id. at 1353.  
Established in 1945, the ICJ serves as the international tribunal for adjudication of disputes be-
tween member states. Id. at 1352, 1353.  The United States and Mexico are both parties to the 
Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention.  
Id. at 1353.  The Optional Protocol states, in relevant part, that “disputes arising out of the inter-
pretation or application of the Vienna Convention . . . ‘lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the ICJ.’” Id.  It further provides that any party of a dispute, which is also a party to the Optional 
Protocol, may properly bring a claim before the ICJ. Id.  At the time Mexico initiated proceedings 
before the ICJ, both parties submitted themselves to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ with 
respect to any disputes arising from the application and interpretation of the Vienna Convention. 
Id. 
17. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 
(Mar. 31). 
18. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1355. 
19. Id.  Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations states that a de-
tained foreign national must be informed of his right to consular notification and, if requested by 
him, the authorities of the receiving state (here, the United States) must, without delay, inform the 
consulate of the sending state that a national of that state has been arrested or detained in any 
manner.  Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36(1)(b), Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6820 (ratified by the United States on Nov. 24, 1969) [hereinafter Vienna 
Convention]. 
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and sentences of the affected Mexican nationals, regardless of Texas’ state 
procedural default rules.20  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, 
denied a certificate of appealability, holding that the Vienna Convention did 
not confer individually enforceable rights, and Vienna Convention claims 
were subject to state procedural default rules.21  Following the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s decision, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.22 
In 2005, before the Supreme Court could hear oral arguments, Presi-
dent George W. Bush issued a Memorandum to the United States Attorney 
General.23  The President declared that the United States would discharge 
its international obligations under Avena, by having state courts provide the 
required review and reconsideration to the fifty-one Mexican nationals 
named in Avena.24  Relying on the President’s Memorandum, Medellín 
filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals.25  The United States Supreme Court subsequently dis-
missed Medellín’s petition for certiorari as improvidently granted.26  The 
Court dismissed the petition for certiorari because the state court proceed-
ings might have provided Medellín with the review and reconsideration or-
dered by the ICJ.27  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Me-
dellín’s second state habeas application as abuse of writ, holding that 
neither the President’s Memorandum, nor the ICJ decision, could remove 
the state procedural bar on Medellín’s application for relief.28  The United 
States Supreme Court again granted certiorari.29 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides, “all 
Treaties . . . which shall be made . . . under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
 
20. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1355 (citing Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 72). 
21. Id. (citing Medellín v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 279-80 (5th Cir. 2004)). 
22. Id. (citing Medellín v. Dretke (Medellín I), 544 U.S. 660, 661 (2005) (per curiam)). 
23. Id. 
24. Id.  The full text of the President’s Memorandum reads as follows: 
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the Constitu-
tion and the laws of the United States of America, that the United States will discharge 
its international obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice in 
[Avena], by having State courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general 
principles of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that 
decision. 
Id. 
25. Id. at 1356 (citing Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315, 322-23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. (citing Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d at 352). 
29. Id. 
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shall be bound thereby.”30  The complex decision of Medellín v. Texas31 im-
plicates numerous relevant treaties.  First, the applicable sections of the 
Vienna Convention, the Optional Protocol, and the United Nations Charter 
are examined.  Then, the distinction between self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties is explained.32  The role of the Executive in the 
implementation of international treaties is analyzed next.  Finally, a discus-
sion of proceedings before the International Court of Justice, including the 
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, and the United 
States Supreme Court’s response to Avena, is provided. 
A. THE RELEVANT TREATIES: INTERPRETATION 
AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The first section introduces treaties relevant to the United States Su-
preme Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas, which include the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, the Optional Protocol to the Vienna 
Convention, and the United Nations Charter.  An examination of what 
makes international treaties self-executing or non-self-executing is then 
provided.  The examination of the principle of self-execution is followed by 
an analysis of the Executive’s role in the implementation of these treaties. 
1. The Relevant Treaties: The Vienna Convention, the Optional 
Protocol, and the United Nations Charter 
The Vienna Convention was drafted in 1963 to promote open relations 
among nations.33  In 1969, upon the advice and consent of the Senate, the 
United States ratified the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.34  Ar-
ticle 36 of the Convention on Consular Relations facilitates consular func-
tions among the member states.35  The Article contains two provisions, 
particularly relevant to the understanding of Medellín’s claim for the viola-
tion of his Vienna Convention rights.36  First, Article 36(1)(b) requires the 
signatory nations to the Convention to inform arrested foreign nationals of 
their right to request assistance from their nation’s consulate.37  Second, Ar-
 
30. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
31. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
32. See generally Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy 
Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 604-06 (2008) (dis-
cussing the difference between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties and the United 
States Supreme Court’s precedent relevant to making that distinction). 
33. Vienna Convention, supra note 19, preamble, at 77, 79. 
34. Id. preamble, at 77. 
35. Id. art. 36, at 100-01. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. art. 36(1)(b), at 101. 
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ticle 36(2) requires that the rights referenced in subsection one be exercised 
in conformity with the laws and regulations of the arresting State, provided 
these laws and regulations give full effect to the purposes for which the 
rights are intended.38 
At the time the Supreme Court heard Medellín, the United States was 
also a party to the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention.39  Article I 
of the Optional Protocol compels member states to submit all disputes aris-
ing out of the interpretation and application of the Vienna Convention to the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.40  The Article 
further provides that any party to a dispute may bring the dispute before the 
ICJ, given that the party is also a party to the present Protocol.41  By ratify-
ing the Optional Protocol, the United States agreed to submit itself to the 
specific jurisdiction of the ICJ with respect to any claims arising under the 
Vienna Convention.42 
The third and final treaty relevant to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Medellín, the United Nations Charter (U.N. Charter), provides that each 
member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of 
the ICJ in any case to which it is a party.43  In addition, annexed to the U.N. 
Charter is the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute).44  
The ICJ Statute sets the organizational structure of the Court and provides 
the governing procedures for cases brought before the ICJ.45  Furthermore, 
the ICJ Statute states that an ICJ judgment is final and has binding force as 
to the parties of a particular case.46  Once the relevant treaties have been 
 
38. Id. art. 36(2), at 101. 
39. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 
U.S.T. 325, 369 T.I.A.S. No. 6820 [hereinafter Optional Protocol]. 
40. Id. art. I, at 326. 
41. Id. 
42. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 339 (2006).  On March 7, 2005, following the 
ICJ decision in Avena, the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Con-
vention. Id. (citing Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, to Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-
General of the United Nations (Mar. 7, 2005)). 
43. Charter of the United Nations art. 94(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1051, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml [hereinafter U.N. Charter]. 
44. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, available 
at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=o [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
45. Id. art. 59-60, at 1062-63. 
46. Id.  According to the ICJ Statute, a State may consent to ICJ jurisdiction in one of two 
ways:  (1) the State may consent to the ICJ’s general jurisdiction, including jurisdiction over any 
dispute arising out of a general international treaty or law; or (2) it may consent to specific juris-
diction over a particular category of disputes. Id.  In 1985, the United States withdrew from the 
general jurisdiction of the ICJ. Id. (citing U.S. Dept. of State Letter and Statement Concerning 
Termination of Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction (Oct. 7, 1985)).  As previously men-
tioned, in 2005, the United States also withdrew from the specific jurisdiction of the ICJ with re-
spect to disputes arising out of the interpretation and application of the Vienna Convention.  
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identified, the next step for courts is to inquire whether the treaty is self-
executing, that is, judicially enforceable.47 
2. Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties 
The United States Supreme Court, in Foster v. Neilson,48 introduced 
for the first time the concept of self-execution.49  The distinction between 
self-executing and non-self-executing treaties is examined through the 
framework established in Foster.50  In Foster v. Neilson, the Supreme Court 
examined an 1819 treaty between the United States and Spain.51  The rele-
vant treaty provision stated that grants of land made by Spain shall be rati-
fied and confirmed to the grantee.52  The Court held that the treaty was non-
self-executing because the language “shall be ratified” demonstrated that 
the treaty contemplated further legislative action.53  Non-self-executing 
treaties, the Court stated, required action by the political—not the judicial—
branch and could be enforced only by implementing legislation.54  On the 
contrary, the Court explained that a self-executing treaty operated of itself, 
without legislative aid.55  A self-executing treaty was thus equivalent to an 
act of the legislature and was automatically binding on the courts of the 
United States.56  The distinction between self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties established in Foster continued to be the governing prin-
ciple for Supreme Court decisions, although the distinction proved difficult 
to apply.57 
In Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States,58 residents of Puerto Rico 
brought suit against the United States, alleging their inability to vote in 
 
Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 339 (citing Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, to Kofi 
A. Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations (Mar. 7, 2005)). 
47. See Vázquez, supra note 32, at 628 (discussing the concept of self-execution and the 
exception of non-self-execution). 
48. 27 U.S. 253 (1829), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 
51 (1833). 
49. Foster, 27 U.S. at 314. 
50. See discussion infra Part II.A.2 (explaining the difference between the principles of self-
execution and non-self-execution). 
51. Foster, 27 U.S. at 310. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 315. 
54. Id.; see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that a non-self-
executing treaty could be carried into effect only through an act of the legislature). 
55. Foster, 27 U.S. at 314. 
56. Id. at 315; see also Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194 (stating that only self-executing treaties 
have the same legal effect as an act by the legislature). 
57. See Vázquez, supra note 32, at 633 (explaining that nations do not concern themselves 
with questions of domestic implementation when negotiating international treaties). 
58. 417 F.3d. 145 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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presidential elections ran contrary to certain international treaty obligations 
assumed by the United States.59  The First Circuit Court of Appeals 
acknowledged the numerous treaties signed by the United States over the 
years and recognized the treaties comprised international commitments.60  
The Court, however, held that the treaties could become domestic law only 
if they were self-executing or if Congress enacted implementing statutes.61  
Thus, in rejecting the petitioners’ claim, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
reaffirmed the long-standing principle that international treaties are not 
binding domestic law unless they are self-executed or legislatively imple-
mented.62  The First Circuit further held that a federal court could not find 
the United States in violation of its treaty obligations where the President 
negotiated a non-self-executing treaty and Congress had refused to adopt 
implementing legislation.63  To hold otherwise, the First Circuit stated, 
would be an attempt to undermine the constitutional allocations of power 
and would constitute an attempt by a federal court to do what both the 
President and Congress have expressly declined to do—give the treaty do-
mestically binding legal effect.64  The First Circuit failed to address, how-
ever, the power of the Executive to bind domestic courts in the absence of 
implementing legislation by Congress.65 
3. The Authority of the Executive in Implementing 
International Treaties 
Supreme Court decisions provide limited guidance on the President’s 
“Article II treaty-implementation authority [] to circumvent ordinary legis-
lative process and preempt state law.”66  However, as with any other 
governmental power, the President’s authority to act with respect to inter-
national treaty obligations arises from either an act of Congress or from the 
Constitution itself.67  Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & 
 
59. Igartua-De La Rosa, 417 F.3d at 146-47. 
60. Id. at 150. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. See discussion infra Part II.A.3; see also Ernest A. Young, Supranational Rulings as 
Judgments and Precedents, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 477, 514-15 (2008) (discussing the 
President’s power to execute treaties). 
66.  Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1390 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the lack of precedent 
concerning the authority of the Executive to preempt contrary state law pursuant to a ratified 
treaty); see also Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. Of California, 512 U.S. 298, 329 (1994) 
(refusing to consider “the scope of the President’s power to preempt state law pursuant to author-
ity delegated by a statute or a ratified treaty”); but see United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 
(1942) (stating that state law must yield if inconsistent with provisions of international treaties). 
67. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952). 
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Tube Co. v. Sawyer68 provides the framework for evaluating executive ac-
tion in this area.69 
In Youngstown, Justice Jackson explained that the President’s ability to 
act could be placed in one of three broad categories.70  In the first category, 
where the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of 
Congress, the President’s authority is at its maximum, for it includes all of 
his or her Article II powers plus all the powers that Congress can delegate 
to the Executive.71  In the second category, where the President acts in the 
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, the President 
has all of his or her Article II powers plus any powers that fall in the “twi-
light zone,” or, the powers that overlap with those of Congress.72  Finally, 
where the President acts in contravention of the will of Congress, the Exec-
utive’s power is at its minimum, as the President can only rely on the exclu-
sive Article II powers—those that belong to the President and the President 
only.73  Thus, the authority of the Executive to implement treaties and give 
binding domestic effect to the judgments of the ICJ depends on whether the 
President acts pursuant to, in the absence of, or contrary to the will of Con-
gress.74  In the past decade, the ICJ has heard and ruled on the implementa-
tion of United States’ treaty obligations in proceedings concerning nationals 
of Paraguay, Germany, and Mexico.75 
B. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
Proceedings against the United States for Article 36 violations under 
the Vienna Convention have been brought before the ICJ on three separate 
occasions—first, by Paraguay in 1998, then by Germany in 1999, and fi-
nally, by Mexico in 2003.76  In each case, the authorities of the United 
 
68. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
69. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
70. Id. 
71. Id.  
72. Id. at 637. 
73. Id. 
74. See generally discussion infra Part II.A.3 (examining the Youngstown framework in the 
context of the President’s treaty-implementation authority). 
75. See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing proceedings against the United States brought 
before the International Court of Justice). 
76. See generally Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 
(Provisional Measures Order of Apr. 9) (holding the United States in violation of Article 36(1)(b) 
of the Vienna Convention by failing to inform the arrested foreign national of his right to consular 
notification under the Convention);  see also LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27) 
(stating the United States had an obligation under the Vienna Convention to inform the detained 
foreign nationals of their right to consular notification); Avena, 2004 I.C.J at 17 (explaining the 
United States violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by failing to inform the 
Mexican Consulate of Medellín’s arrest and detention). 
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States arrested a national of the respective foreign State and subsequently 
convicted and sentenced that foreign national to death.77  After a series of 
unsuccessful appeals in each case, the affected foreign state brought suit on 
behalf of its nationals before the ICJ.78  In all three cases, the ICJ found that 
the United States had breached its obligation under the Vienna Convention 
by failing to inform the arrested foreign nationals of their Convention-given 
right to consular notification.79  Moreover, in LaGrand80 and Avena, the ICJ 
held that to remedy the Article 36 violations, the United States was obli-
gated to review and reconsider the convictions and sentences of the affected 
foreign nationals, notwithstanding procedural default rules.81 
1. Paraguay Initiates Proceedings Against the United States 
Before the ICJ 
In 1993, a Virginia state court convicted Angel Francisco Breard, a Pa-
raguayan national, of murder and sentenced him to death.82  Following his 
conviction and sentence, Breard filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 
a federal district court, raising for the first time his Vienna Convention 
claim.83  The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia denied the petition as procedurally defaulted because Breard failed to 
raise the claim at trial or on direct appeal.84  The execution date was set for 
April 14, 1998.85  On April 3, 1998, Paraguay initiated proceedings against 
the United States alleging Breard was not informed of his Vienna Conven-
tion right to contact the Paraguayan consular office in violation of Article 
36(1) of the Convention.86  In addition, Paraguay argued that the United 
 
77. See, e.g., LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 475 (discussing the arrest of two German nationals in 
relation to a first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery and their subsequent convictions 
and death sentences). 
78. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1998 I.C.J. at 249 (stating that Para-
guay instituted proceedings with the ICJ following Breard’s unsuccessful appeals in the United 
States’ courts). 
79. See, e.g., LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 515. 
80. (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27). 
81. See, e.g., Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 65-66 (holding that review and reconsideration of the for-
eign nationals’ convictions and sentences should not be barred by state procedural default rules); 
see also LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 516 (stating that while the United States can review the convic-
tions and sentences by means of its own choosing, the review shall not be affected by procedural 
default rules). 
82. Breard v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 670, 673, 682 (Va. 1994) (affirming the Circuit 
Court for Arlington County in finding Breard guilty of rape and capital murder and sentencing 
him to death). 
83. Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1260 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
84. Id. at 1263. 
85. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 249 (Provi-
sional Measures Order of Apr. 9). 
86. Id. at 248-49. 
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States, as the detaining State, failed to advise the Paraguayan consular of-
ficers of Breard’s detention, thus preventing the Paraguayan officials from 
rendering assistance.87 
Drawing on the Court’s power to order provisional measures, the ICJ 
unanimously held that the United States shall take all necessary measures to 
ensure that Breard would not be executed pending final decision of the ICJ 
proceedings.88  Breard subsequently filed a petition for original writ of ha-
beas corpus with the United States Supreme Court, asking the court to en-
force the ICJ order.89  The Supreme Court, by a vote of six to three, denied 
the petition.90  The Court stated that while the ICJ’s interpretation of 
international treaties deserved due consideration, absent an express indica-
tion to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State must govern the 
treaty’s implementation in that State.91  The Court held that the language of 
Article 36(2) of the Vienna Convention clearly allowed a signatory State to 
exercise the rights expressed in the Convention in conformity with its own 
laws and regulations, provided such laws and regulations gave full effect to 
the purposes for which the rights were intended.92  The Court concluded 
that denial of Breard’s petition was proper because Breard’s failure to raise 
the Vienna Convention claim in state court first rendered the claim procedu-
rally defaulted, in violation of the laws of the United States and the Com-
monwealth of Virginia.93  The ICJ expanded on its holding in Breard a year 
later when Germany initiated proceedings against the United States, alleg-
ing the United States had violated its obligations under the Vienna 
Convention.94 
2. Germany Initiates Proceedings Against the United States 
Before the ICJ 
On January 7, 1982, Arizona law enforcement officers arrested Karl 
and Walter LaGrand, German nationals, for their alleged involvement in an 
attempted armed bank robbery in Marana, Arizona.95  The law enforcement 
officers suspected that Karl and Walter LaGrand murdered the bank manger 
and seriously injured another bank employee during the course of the al-
 
87. Id. at 249.  
88. Id. at 258. 
89. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 374 (1998) (per curiam). 
90. Id. at 378-81. 
91. Id. at 375.  
92. Id. (citing Vienna Convention, supra note 19, art. 36(2), at 101). 
93. Id. at 375-76. 
94. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the proceedings initiated by Germany against 
the United States before the ICJ). 
95. LaGrand, (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 475 (June 27). 
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leged robbery.96  In 1984, the Superior Court of Pima County, Arizona, 
convicted both Karl and Walter LaGrand of murder in the first degree and 
sentenced each to death.97  After a series of unsuccessful appeals, the La-
Grands filed applications for writs of habeas corpus in the United States 
District Court for the District of Arizona, for the first time asserting viola-
tions of their Vienna Convention rights.98  The district court dismissed the 
claim as procedurally defaulted, given the Petitioners’ failure to raise the 
claim at trial or on direct appeal.99  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the judgment and in 1999, the United States Supreme Court denied 
further review.100  The execution of Karl LaGrand took place on February 
24, 1999.101 
On March 2, 1999, the day before the scheduled date of execution for 
Walter LaGrand, Germany initiated proceedings before the ICJ.102  Ger-
many alleged that in arresting, detaining, and failing to inform Karl and 
Walter LaGrand of their Article 36 rights, the United States violated the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and deprived Germany of pro-
viding consular assistance to its detained nationals.103  On March 3, 1999, 
the ICJ issued an order indicating provisional measures and requested that 
the United States ensure the stay of execution of Walter LaGrand pending 
final decision of the ICJ.104  On the same day, Germany initiated proceed-
ings in the United States Supreme Court, seeking compliance with the ICJ 
order of provisional measures.105  The Supreme Court refused to exercise its 
original jurisdiction in the action brought by Germany against the United 
States and dismissed the case.106  In relation to these proceedings, the 
 
96. Id. 
97. State v. LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563, 565 (Ariz. 1987).  In addition to the conviction of mur-
der in the first degree, the Superior Court of Pima, Arizona, convicted the defendants of attempted 
murder in the first degree, attempted armed robbery, and two counts of kidnapping. Id.  The Su-
perior Court sentenced the LaGrands to death for the first-degree murder and to concurrent sen-
tences of imprisonment for the other charges. Id. 
98. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1261-63 (9th Cir. 1998). 
99. Id. at 1259.  
100. LaGrand v. Stewart, 170 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1061 
(1999). 
101. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 478. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 473-74. 
104. Id. at 479.  
105. Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1999) (per 
curiam).  
106. Id. at 112.  The Court stated that Germany did not have the right, under the Vienna Con-
vention, to assert a claim against the State of Arizona for imposing a death sentence upon a Ger-
man national. Id.  The Court viewed such an assertion as contrary to the principles of the Eleventh 
Amendment, which addresses a state’s ability to be sued. Id.  Moreover, because Arizona imposed 
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United States Solicitor General, as council of record, took the position that 
the ICJ order was not binding and did not provide a basis for judicial re-
lief.107  The State of Arizona executed Walter LaGrand on March 3, 1999, 
the same day the United States Supreme Court dismissed Germany’s mo-
tion for stay of execution.108 
Although both Karl and Walter LaGrand were executed, Germany did 
not withdraw its case from the ICJ.109  In reviewing the merits of Ger-
many’s case, the ICJ, by a fourteen-to-one vote, held that the United States 
breached its obligations to Germany, by failing to inform Karl and Walter 
LaGrand of their rights under Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention 
and thereby depriving Germany from rendering timely consular assistance 
to its detained nationals.110  The ICJ found that Article 36(1)(b) of the 
Vienna Convention conferred upon foreign nationals individual rights, 
which could be invoked on their behalf by their nation in proceedings be-
fore the ICJ.111  Furthermore, the ICJ asserted that the United States 
breached its obligation under the Convention by failing to comply with the 
ICJ order on provisional measures because such an order bound the United 
States.112  The ICJ concluded that, in the future, should German nationals be 
detained, convicted, and sentenced to severe penalties irrespective of their 
rights under Article 36(1)(b), the United States would be obligated to pro-
vide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the con-
victions and sentences.113  In doing so, the United States must take into ac-
count the possible prejudice caused by such violations.114  Moreover, the 
ICJ held that the review and reconsideration should not be barred by state 
procedural default rules, as such a bar would offend the purposes for which 
the rights were intended and would necessarily constitute a violation of Ar-
ticle 36(2) of the Vienna Convention.115  The ICJ reached the same conclu-
sion in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals.116 
 
the sentence in 1984 and Germany learned about it in 1992, the claim was tardy, thus preventing 
the Court from exercising jurisdiction. Id. 
107. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J at 479; see also Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 
526 U.S. at 113 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting the letter by the Solicitor General for the United 
States, in which the Solicitor General admitted he did not have the “time to read the materials tho-
roughly or to digest the contents” of the order issued by the ICJ). 
108. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 479-80. 
109. Id. at 480. 
110. Id. at 515. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 516. 
113. Id.  
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. See discussion infra Part II.B.3 (analyzing the ICJ decision in Avena). 
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3. Mexico Initiates Proceedings Against the United States 
Before the ICJ 
On January 9, 2003, Mexico instituted proceedings before the ICJ 
against the United States, alleging violations of Article 36 of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations with respect to fifty-two Mexican na-
tionals, including Medellín.117  Mexico argued that in fifty of the fifty-two 
cases, authorities in the United States failed to inform the Mexican nation-
als of their right to consular notification under Article 36(1)(b) of the 
Vienna Convention.118  On February 5, 2003, the ICJ issued a provisional 
measures order regarding three of the named Mexican nationals, who at that 
time had exhausted all judicial remedies in the United States and were fac-
ing executions in the upcoming months or even weeks.119  The ICJ ordered 
the United States to take all actions available at its disposal to ensure these 
individuals would not be executed pending final judgment of the ICJ.120 
The ICJ rendered its decision on the merits of Mexico’s claim on 
March 31, 2004.121  It held, by a fourteen-to-one vote, that by failing to in-
form the fifty-one detained Mexican nationals of their rights under Article 
36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention, the United States breached its obliga-
tions under the Convention.122  The United States further breached its 
obligations under the Vienna Convention by failing to notify the Mexican 
consular post of the detention of forty-eight of the fifty-one named Mexican 
nationals and thus depriving Mexico of the opportunity to provide consular 
assistance to these individuals.123  According to the ICJ, the appropriate 
reparation would be for the United States to provide, by means of its own 
choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of 
the named Mexican nationals.124  In doing so, however, the United States 
 
117. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 
17, 54 (Mar. 31).  At the time Mexico filed its application with the ICJ, all fifty-two individuals 
were on death row. Id. at 27.  In addition, of the fifty-two cases involved in the proceedings 
brought by Mexico before the ICJ, forty-nine were at different stages in state or federal courts in 
the United States. Id. 
118. Id. at 26.  In the remaining two cases, Mexico asserted the detained individuals were 
informed of their Vienna Convention rights but not without delay, as required by the Convention. 
Id. 
119. Id. at 27.  The three individuals were Mr. Fierro, Mr. Moreno, and Mr. Torres. Id.  At 
the time of judgment, none of them had been executed, although an execution date of May 18, 
2004 was set for Mr. Torres by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Id. at 28. 
120. Id. at 17. 
121. Id. at 12. 
122. Id. at 71.  The number of Mexican nationals was reduced because in the case of Mr. 
Salcido (case No. 22), the ICJ found that Mexico failed to prove that the United States’ authorities 
were aware Mr. Salcido was a foreign national. Id. at 46. 
123. Id. at 54. 
124. Id. at 72. 
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was obligated to take into account the violations of the rights expressed in 
the Vienna Convention and more specifically, the legal consequences of 
such violations on the individual criminal proceedings.125  Lastly, as in La-
Grand, the ICJ concluded that the process of review and reconsideration 
was best suited for the judicial process and should therefore occur within 
the judicial proceedings concerning the individual defendants.126  State 
procedural default rules should not bar the process of review.127  The United 
States Supreme Court first responded to the ICJ judgments in LaGrand and 
Avena in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,128 issued after the ICJ rendered its 
decision in Avena, but involving individuals not named in Avena.129 
C. U.S. SUPREME COURT RESPONSE: ARTICLE 36 CLAIMS ARE 
SUBJECT TO PROCEDURAL DEFAULT RULES 
In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, the United States Supreme Court con-
fronted the question of whether a defendant’s failure to raise an Article 36 
claim at trial or on direct appeal rendered the claim procedurally defaulted 
in a post conviction proceeding.130  Answering this question in the affirma-
tive, the Supreme Court held that post-conviction arguments asserting vi-
olations of the Vienna Convention were subject to the same state procedural 
default rules as any other federal law claim.131  The case involved Mario 
Bustillo, a Honduran national, whose jury conviction of first-degree murder 
resulted in a thirty-year prison sentence.132  Following the conviction, Bus-
tillo filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court where, for the 
first time, he raised the violation of his Vienna Convention right to consular 
notification.133  The court dismissed the claim as procedurally barred be-
cause Bustillo had failed to raise it at trial or on direct appeal.134  The Vir-
 
125. Id. at 62. 
126. Id. at 65-66 (citing LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 516 (June 27)). 
127. Id. 
128. 548 U.S. 331 (2006). 
129. See discussion infra Part II.C (analyzing the response of the United States Supreme 
Court to the ICJ judgment in Avena, which found that claims arising out of violations of the 
Vienna Convention are not subject to state procedural default rules). 
130. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 337.  Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the 
Court, in which Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined. Id.  Justice Ginsburg filed an 
opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 360.  Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
Justices Stevens and Souter joined, and in which Justice Ginsburg joined as to Part II. Id. at 365. 
131. Id. at 356. 
132. Id. at 341. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 342. 
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ginia Supreme Court found no reversible error, and the United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari on the Vienna Convention issue.135 
Relying on the ICJ decisions in LaGrand and Avena, Bustillo urged the 
Court to interpret the Vienna Convention as precluding the application of 
procedural default rules to his claim, arguing such application would pre-
vent the United States from giving full effect to the purposes for which the 
rights were intended.136  The Court, in rejecting Bustillo’s argument, held 
that while ICJ interpretations of international treaties should be given due 
consideration, such interpretations are not binding on the courts of the 
United States.137  ICJ judgments, the Court noted, are binding only on the 
parties involved in a particular case.138  Furthermore, the Court pointed out 
that ICJ judgments were not to be awarded significant weight because, fol-
lowing Avena, the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol and 
ceased to recognize ICJ jurisdiction in disputes arising out of the Vienna 
Convention.139  The Court concluded LaGrand and Avena did not control 
the outcome of Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon.140 
In addition, the Court found that the language of Article 36 allowed 
procedural default rules to apply to Vienna Convention claims.141  The 
Court thus rejected the ICJ conclusion in LaGrand and Avena that applica-
tion of procedural rules failed to give full effect to the purposes for which 
the rights were intended.142  The Court stated that the ICJ failed to distin-
guish between the importance of procedural default rules in an adversarial 
system, such as the United States legal system, and an inquisitorial legal 
system, common in the majority of Vienna Convention signatory nations.143  
 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 352-53 (citing LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 497 (June 27) and Case 
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 66 (Mar. 31)). 
137. Id. at 354. 
138. Id.  The Court interpreted Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
to mean that ICJ judgments did not bind other courts, including the ICJ itself, because any 
decision rendered by the ICJ had “no binding force except between the parties and in respect of 
that particular case.” Id. at 354-55 (quoting ICJ Statute at art. 59, 1062). 
139. Id. at 355. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 356. 
142. Id.  Article 36(2) provides that the right expressed in Article 36(1) “shall be exercised in 
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, 
that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the 
rights accorded under this article are intended.” Vienna Convention, supra note 19, art. 36(2), at 
101. 
143. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 356-57.  The Court noted that an adversary system relies 
primarily on the parties to raise important issues before the courts and that procedural default 
rules are designed to encourage parties to do so at the proper time for adjudication. Id. (emphasis 
in original).  On the contrary, in a magistrate-directed, inquisitorial legal system, the responsibility 
to raise a legal issue does not rest primarily with the parties themselves, and failure to raise a legal 
error can therefore be partly attributed to the magistrate or the state itself. Id. at 357.  Thus, be-
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Given the lack of express or implied language in the Vienna Convention to 
the contrary, the Court held that claims under Article 36 of the Convention 
were subject to state procedural default rules.144 
Writing for the minority, Justice Breyer stated that pursuant to the ICJ 
decisions in LaGrand and Avena, the Vienna Convention obligated member 
States to inform detained foreign nationals of the right to contact their na-
tion’s consulate and seek assistance.145  The dissent did not construe the ICJ 
judgments as requiring American courts to ignore procedural default 
rules.146  Instead, the dissent noted that all that was required of a state court 
with regard to Article 36 violations was to excuse a procedural default rule 
where the defendant’s failure to bring the claim sooner was the result of the 
underlying violation or where the State was unwilling to provide some other 
effective remedy.147 
The decision in Sanchez-Llamas reaffirmed the Court’s position that 
treaty implementation is subject to the procedural default rules of the forum 
state, absent a clear and express statement to the contrary.148  Moreover, the 
Court held that ICJ judgments are not controlling on the courts of the 
United States and are binding only as to the parties of a particular case.149  
Thus, while LaGrand and Avena were entitled to respectful consideration, 
the Court in Sanchez-Llamas refused to require states to hear Vienna Con-
vention claims, notwithstanding state procedural default rules.150  In Me-
dellín v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court expanded on the issue of 
implementation of ICJ judgments by examining not only the power of the 
Court, but also the power of the Executive to preempt state procedural de-
fault rules and give binding domestic legal effect to the decisions of the 
ICJ.151 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Medellín, Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, 
in which Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined.152  The 
 
cause parties to a dispute in an adversary system have the primary responsibility of raising their 
claims promptly, the ICJ interpretation of Article 36 is inconsistent with the basic characteristics 
of an adversary system. Id. 
144. Id. at 360. 
145. Id. at 370 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
146. Id. at 387. 
147. Id. at 388.   
148. Id. at 351 (citing Breard v. Green, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998)). 
149. Id. at 354. 
150. Id. at 360. 
151. See discussion infra Part III.A (analyzing the majority opinion in Medellín v. Texas). 
152. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1352 (2008). 
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majority held that neither the ICJ judgment in Avena nor the President’s 
Memorandum constituted directly enforceable federal law that preempted 
state procedural default rules.153  Justice Stevens concurred with the judg-
ment.154  Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Souter 
and Ginsburg joined.155 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
The Court granted certiorari in Medellín v. Texas to decide two ques-
tions.156  First, the Court addressed whether the ICJ judgment in Avena was 
directly enforceable as domestic law in a state court in the United States.157  
Second, the Court examined whether the President’s Memorandum could 
bind state courts in the United States to give effect to the ICJ judgment in 
Avena, without regard to state procedural default rules.158  In Avena, the ICJ 
found the United States violated the rights of fifty-one named Mexican na-
tionals, including Medellín, to consular notification under the Vienna Con-
vention.159  The ICJ further held that the United States was obligated to pro-
vide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the 
sentences and convictions of the named Mexican nationals, notwithstanding 
state procedural default rules.160  The majority found that while the Avena 
judgment created an international obligation on the part of the United 
States, in the absence of implementing legislation, the Avena judgment did 
not constitute binding federal law that preempted state procedural default 
rules.161  The Court further held that the President did not have the authority 
to unilaterally execute an international judgment by giving it binding do-
mestic effect.162 
1. The ICJ Judgment in Avena is Not Automatically Binding 
Domestic Law 
Medellín argued that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution ren-
dered Avena a binding obligation on state and federal courts in the United 
 
153. Id. at 1353. 
154. Id. at 1372 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
155. Id. at 1375 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
156. Id. at 1353. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 1352 (citing Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. 
U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 71 (Mar. 31)). 
160. Id. (citing Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 72). 
161. Id. at 1367. 
162. Id. at 1369. 
        
452 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:435 
States.163  Medellín asserted that the treaties requiring compliance with 
Avena were already the “law of the land,” and therefore the ICJ judgment 
was binding federal law that preempted state procedural default rules.164  In 
rejecting Medellín’s argument, the Court distinguished between treaties that 
have automatic domestic legal effect and treaties that might constitute an 
international obligation on the part of the United States, but cannot by 
themselves become binding federal law.165  A treaty with automatic effect 
as domestic law is a self-executing treaty, operating of itself and not re-
quiring further legislative action.166  In contrast, the Court found that non-
self-executing treaties could become binding federal law only through an 
act of Congress.167  Thus, the Court concluded that while some treaties 
might impose an international obligation on the part of the United States, 
international treaties can become domestic law only if they are self-
executing or if Congress has enacted legislation to carry them into effect.168  
To determine whether Avena was automatically binding domestic law, the 
Court analyzed the treaties underlying the ICJ judgment.169 
The Court held that treaty interpretation must begin with the text of the 
treaty, followed by due consideration of the treaty’s negotiations and draft-
ing history.170  The majority used this interpretive approach in determining 
whether, in the absence of implementing legislation, the treaties underlying 
the ICJ judgments in Avena created binding federal law that preempted state 
procedural default rules.171  The Court noted that as a signatory to the Op-
tional Protocol, the United States agreed to submit itself to the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ with respect to disputes arising out of the application 
and interpretation of the Vienna Convention.172  In doing so, however, the 
majority pointed out that the United States did not necessarily agree to be 
bound by ICJ decisions.173  Finding that nothing in the language of the Op-
tional Protocol required parties to comply with ICJ judgments or provided 
 
163. Id. at 1356. 
164. Id.; see also U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829)). 
167. Id. (citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)). 
168. Id. (citing Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005)). 
169. Id. at 1357. 
170. Id. (citing Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996); Air France v. 
Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1985)). 
171. Id. at 1357-67. 
172. Id. at 1358. 
173. Id.  The Court stated that a party’s decision to submit to compulsory non-binding 
arbitration, for example, did not automatically require the party to treat the arbitral tribunal’s deci-
sion as binding. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2018(1), 
Dec. 17, 1992 32 I.L.M. 697 (1993) (stating that parties’ agreement on a resolution should nor-
mally conform with the tribunal’s determination). 
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for enforcement mechanisms of such judgments, the Court concluded the 
Optional Protocol was simply a grant of jurisdiction and nothing more.174 
The Court then considered the text of Article 94 of the U.N. Charter 
and the obligation it imposed on signatory nations to comply with judg-
ments of the ICJ.175  The Court acknowledged that under the U.N. Charter, 
the United States undertook to comply with those decisions of the ICJ, to 
which the United States was a party.176  However, the Court interpreted that 
the language “undertakes to comply” to constitute a commitment on the part 
of the United States to take future action through the political branches to 
ensure compliance with ICJ decisions.177 
Moreover, the enforcement provision of Article 94 provided that the 
remedy for non-compliance with ICJ judgments was a referral to the Secu-
rity Council by the aggrieved party—a remedy that was clearly diplomatic 
and not judicial in nature.178  The Court reasoned the remedy provided in 
Article 94 was a clear indication the U.N. Charter did not contemplate au-
tomatic enforceability of ICJ judgments in domestic courts; otherwise, nei-
ther Mexico nor the ICJ would need to proceed to the Security Council to 
enforce the judgment in Avena.179  Thus, the Court concluded that the en-
forcement mechanism set out in the U.N. Charter fatally undermined Me-
dellín’s position that the U.N Charter rendered ICJ decisions automatically 
enforceable in domestic courts.180  To hold otherwise, the Court stated, 
would be to eliminate the option of non-compliance contemplated by Ar-
ticle 94 of the U.N. Charter.181 
Lastly, the Court examined the text of the ICJ Statute and incorporated 
the U.N. Charter, which allowed the ICJ to hear disputes among member-
states.182  The Court noted that while proceedings before the ICJ are often 
the result of disputes among persons or entities, the ICJ Statute clearly 
stated that only member-states, and not individuals, could be parties before 
 
174. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1358. 
175. Id. (citing U.N. Charter, supra note 43, art. 94, at 1051). 
176. Id. (citing U.N. Charter, supra note 43, art. 94(1), at 1051). 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 1359.  The Court further noted that the remedy provided in Article 94(2) was not 
absolute because it required the Security Council to first deem necessary the issuance of a recom-
mendation, which then could still be vetoed by the United States as a member of the Security 
Council. Id.  The Court explained that both the Executive branch and the Senate were aware of 
this procedure when the President agreed to submit the United States to the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the ICJ. Id. 
179. Id. at 1359-60 (citing Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 347 (2006)). 
180. Id. at 1360. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. (citing U.N. Charter, supra note 43, art. 34(1), at 1059). 
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is the ICJ.183  Article 59 of the ICJ Statute further provided that ICJ 
judgments had binding force only as to those member-states that were 
parties to a particular case.184  Given the language of the ICJ Statute, the 
Court found that Medellín, as an individual, could not be a party to an ICJ 
proceeding.185 
Taking into consideration the relevant treaties underlying the ICJ 
judgment in Avena and finding no textual support to the contrary, the Court 
concluded that the relevant treaties were non-self-executing and, in the ab-
sence of implementing legislation, did not afford binding domestic legal ef-
fect to judgments of the ICJ.186  The Court held that while Avena created an 
international obligation on the part of the United States, the ICJ judgment 
did not, by itself, constitute binding federal law that would preempt state 
procedural default rules.187  Neither the text nor the negotiating and drafting 
history of the treaties supported a finding that the President or Senate in-
tended for ICJ judgments to be automatically enforceable in domestic 
courts without the aid of implementing legislation.188  Having found Avena 
did not automatically bind state courts in the United States, the majority 
next considered whether the President had the authority to establish binding 
rules of decision that preempt contrary state laws.189 
2. The ICJ Judgment is Not Binding by Virtue of the 
President’s Memorandum 
The President’s Memorandum stated that the United States would dis-
charge its international obligations under Avena by having state courts pro-
vide the required review and reconsideration to the fifty-one Mexican na-
tionals named in Avena.190  The government argued that the President’s ac-
 
183. Id. (citing U.N. Charter, supra note 43, art. 34, at 1059). 
184. Id. (citing U.N. Charter, supra note 43, art. 59, at 1062). 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 1364.  The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the question of whether the 
Vienna Convention itself was self-executing or whether it conferred individually enforceable 
rights. Id. at 1357 n.4.  Thus, the Court assumed, without deciding, Article 36 of the Vienna Con-
vention granted foreign nationals the right to be informed by the authorities of the detaining state 
of their Convention-given individual right to consular notification. Id. (citing Sanchez-Llamas v. 
Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 342-43 (2006)). 
187. Id. at 1367.  The Court noted that while the judgments of an international tribunal might 
not have automatic domestic legal effect, such a holding did not render the underlying treaty use-
less. Id. at 1365.  The judgment would still constitute international obligations on the part of the 
United States, but such obligations would be best suited for political and diplomatic negotiations. 
Id. (citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884)).  The majority held that Congress was 
free to give the treaties domestic effect and could do so through implementing legislation. Id. 
188. Id. (citing Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 360). 
189. Id. at 1367. 
190. Id. at 1355. 
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tions in issuing the Memorandum stemmed from both his constitutional 
power to settle international disputes and his power to implement treaty ob-
ligations on the part of the United States.191  Therefore, the government 
contended, the President’s actions were consistent with the first category of 
Justice Jackson’s famous tripartite scheme in Youngstown, where the Presi-
dent’s power was at its maximum.192  The Court rejected the government’s 
contention, holding that while the President might have authority to enforce 
international obligations on the part of the United States, the President 
lacked the authority to unilaterally convert a non-self-executing treaty into 
one that was self-executing.193  Congress, not the President, possessed such 
authority.194  The Court stated that a non-self-executing treaty could be-
come domestically binding only upon a congressional act, because the Con-
stitution vested Congress with the power to make the necessary laws and 
the President with the power to execute the laws.195  The Court concluded 
that in the absence of implementing legislation, the non-self-executing trea-
ties underlying Avena did not vest the President, expressly or impliedly, 
with the power to make Avena binding on state courts in the United 
States.196  The President’s Memorandum did not, therefore, fall in the first 
category of Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework established in 
Youngstown.197 
The Court further held that because the Senate ratified the treaties as 
non-self-executing, the President was clearly prohibited from creating do-
mestic law making the treaties binding on state courts in the United 
States.198  The Court concluded the President’s assertion of authority in 
relation to the relevant non-self-executing treaties must therefore fall in the 
third category of the Youngstown framework, where the President’s power 
was at the lowest end of the spectrum.199  Thus, the government’s argument 
that the President’s Memorandum was a valid exercise of power in the 
context of Congress’ acquiescence had to necessarily fail, because congres-
sional acquiescence applied only when the President’s act fell in the second, 
 
191. Id. at 1368. 
192. Id. at 1368 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring)). 
193. Id. at 1368 (citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888), Foster v. Neilson, 
27 U.S. 253, 315 (1829), and Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 
2005) (en banc)). 
194. Id. (citing Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194). 
195. Id. at 1369 (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006)). 
196. Id. 
197. Id. (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
198. Id. 
199. Id. (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
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and not the third category, of Justice Jackson’s Youngstown framework.200  
Given that the President’s Memorandum implementing Avena was not an 
act in the absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, the 
Memorandum could not be given effect as domestic law.201 
The government next argued that the President’s authority to imple-
ment Avena stemmed from his statutory responsibilities and his role in liti-
gating foreign policy concerns.202  The Court rejected this argument stating 
that while Congress authorized the President to represent the United States 
before the United Nations, the ICJ, and the Security Council, such authority 
was pertinent only to the President’s international responsibilities and did 
not accord him the power to unilaterally create domestic law.203  Thus, the 
congressional authority given to the President was confined to the interna-
tional realm and did not apply to the issue presented in this case.204  While 
the President could comply with the treaty’s obligations through different 
means, given they were consistent with the Constitution, he or she could not 
rely upon a non-self-executing treaty to establish binding rules of decision 
that preempt contrary state law.205 
Lastly, the Court noted that the President’s authority to make executive 
agreements settling civil claims between American citizens and foreign 
governments or nationals had been upheld by the Court in the past.206  Ac-
cording to the majority, the President’s Memorandum in Medellín 
represented an unprecedented action by the Executive and was not sup-
ported by a longstanding tradition of congressional acquiescence.207  The 
Court stated that neither the United States government nor Medellín could 
identify other instances in which a presidential directive had been issued to 
state courts.208  Moreover, by compelling state courts to set aside applicable 
procedural default rules, the President’s Memorandum interfered with the 
states’ police power.209  Thus, the Court concluded that the limited authority 
 
200. Id. at 1370.  The government’s argument that the President’s asserted authority was 
based on congressional acquiescence was based on Congress’ failure to act in prior presidential 
resolutions of ICJ controversies. Id.  The Court rejected the government’s arguments stating that 
none of the prior controversies involved the transformation of an international obligation into do-
mestic law. Id.  Given the lack of resemblance between the President’s Memorandum in this case 
and the prior resolutions of ICJ controversies, the government’s claim was not supported. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at 1371. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679-80 (1981)). 
207. Id. at 1372. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
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of the President to settle disputes with foreign governments or nationals 
pursuant to an executive agreement could not be extended to the President’s 
Memorandum regarding the ICJ’s Avena judgment.210 
B. JUSTICE STEVENS’S CONCURRENCE 
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, stating that Avena was not 
binding on courts in the United States and that the relevant treaties did not 
authorize the President to direct state courts to implement the judgment, 
contrary to state procedural default rules.211  In support of the majority’s 
non-self-execution argument, Justice Stevens added that unlike other trea-
ties, the language of the U.N. Charter did not necessarily incorporate inter-
national judgments into domestic law.212  He further noted that while Con-
gress had passed implementing legislation ensuring the enforcement of 
certain other international judgments, none existed in the case of Avena.213  
However, the majority’s opinion failed to persuade Justice Stevens that the 
language of Article 94(1) completely foreclosed the possibility the treaty 
was self-executing.214  According to Justice Stevens, the obligation on the 
part of the United States to undertake to comply with ICJ judgments was 
more consistent with self-execution than the majority allowed.215 
In conclusion, Justice Stevens stated that while Avena was not the “Su-
preme Law of the Land,” the judgment nevertheless constituted an interna-
tional obligation on the part of the United States.216  Justice Stevens pointed 
out that the United States was not absolved from its promise to take future 
action necessary to comply with the ICJ judgment.217  The concurrence as-
serted that the State of Texas needed to act to protect the honor and integrity 
of the nation, because by failing to comply with the Vienna Convention, 
Texas involved the United States in the current dispute in the first place.218  
 
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 1372-73 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
212. Id. at 1373; see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Annex VI, art. 
39, Dec. 10, 1982, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103039, 1833 U.N.T.S. 570 (“[D]ecisions of the [Seabed 
Disputes] chamber shall be enforceable in the territories of the States Parties in the same manner 
as judgments or orders of the highest court of the State Party in whose territory the enforcement is 
sought.”). 
213. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1373; see also Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), art. 54(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 
[1966] 17 U.S.T. 1291 (“Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to 
this Convention as binding and enforce [it] . . . within its territories as if it were a final judgment 
of a court in that State.”). 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 1374. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
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Justice Stevens stated that the cost to Texas for complying with the Avena 
judgment would be minimal.219  On the contrary, the consequences of refus-
ing to comply with the judgment would be significant and would jeopardize 
the rights of American citizens abroad, as well as the United States’ com-
mitment to the authority of international law.220  Given the minimal cost of 
compliance with Avena, Justice Stevens urged the State of Texas to recog-
nize that the issue presented by Medellín was bigger than whether, in the 
absence of implementing legislation, the ICJ and the President could trump 
Texas’ procedural rules.221  Thus, concurring with the majority, Justice Ste-
vens noted the Court’s opinion did not foreclose further appropriate action 
by the State of Texas.222 
C. JUSTICE BREYER’S DISSENT, JOINED BY JUSTICE SOUTER AND 
JUSTICE GINSBURG 
The dissent focused on the Supremacy Clause, which provides that “all 
Treaties . . . which shall be made . . . under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby.”223  The dissent asserted that whenever a treaty 
operates of itself, that is, without the aid of any legislative provision, the 
treaty must be viewed as equivalent to an act of the legislature.224  In the 
Avena case, the United States voluntarily submitted itself to the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ for the purpose of compulsory judgments.225  In addi-
tion, because the President determined that domestic courts should comply 
with the ICJ judgment in Avena, and because Congress did nothing to sug-
 
219. Id. at 1375.  Justice Stevens stated that Avena merely asked the United States “to pro-
vide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences 
of the [affected] Mexican nationals.” Id. at 1374.  The ICJ asked the United States to consider 
whether the violations of the Vienna Convention caused actual prejudice to the Mexican nationals. 
Id.  Finding the likelihood of such prejudice very remote, Justice Stevens concluded the cost to 
Texas for complying with Avena would be minimal. Id. at 1375.  In further support of his argu-
ment, Justice Stevens referred to Oklahoma’s response to Avena. Id.  The Governor of Oklahoma 
commuted the death sentence of another Mexican national named in Avena to life without the pos-
sibility of parole. Id. at n.4.  The Governor based his decision on the following factors:  (1) the 
United States was a signatory to the Vienna Convention; (2) the treaty provided protection for the 
rights of American citizens abroad; (3) the ICJ decision found that the rights of the Mexican na-
tionals have been violated; and (4) the Governor was responding to the United States Department 
of State’s plea to carefully consider the Nation’s treaty obligations. Id. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). 
224. Id. (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829)). 
225. Id. at 1376. 
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gest otherwise, Avena was binding on state courts in the same manner as an 
act of the legislature.226 
1. The ICJ Judgment is Enforceable as a Matter of Domestic 
Law Without Further Legislation 
In answering the question of whether the ICJ judgment was automati-
cally binding on state courts, the dissent relied on the Court’s treaty-related 
cases interpreting the Supremacy Clause and focused in large part on the 
Framers’ intent in drafting the Clause.227  The dissent stated the Supremacy 
Clause was designed to allow binding international treaties to have domes-
tic legal effect without the need for implementing legislation.228  The cases, 
following the ratification of the Constitution, provided further insight into 
the Framers’ intent by holding that a treaty was the law of the land unless it 
specifically contemplated further legislative action and thus addressed itself 
to the political and not the judicial department.229 
The dissent noted that while there was no “magic answer” as to what 
provisions were self-executing, the Court’s precedents clearly indicated that 
the majority’s approach of requiring self-execution language in the treaty’s 
text was misplaced.230  The provisions found by the Court to be self-
executing in the past lacked the textual clarity required by the majority.231  
The dissent reasoned the lack of clarity in treaty language was most likely 
the result of the drafters’ awareness of national differences in determining 
the necessary requirements for a treaty to become domestic law.232  
Therefore, the dissent concluded the absence or presence of textual clarity 
 
226. Id. (citing Foster, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829)). 
227. Id. at 1377. 
228. Id.  The dissent relied primarily on the views expressed by Justice Iredell, a member of 
the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, which were later used by Justice Story to explain the 
Framer’s intent behind the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 1378 (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 696-97 (1833)). 
229. Id. at 1379 (quoting Foster, 27 U.S. at 314).  In Foster, the Court found a treaty to be 
non-self-executing because of the specific language of the treaty, “shall be ratified.” Id. (citing 
Foster, 27 U.S. at 315).  Such language, the Court held, demonstrated that the provision contem-
plated further legislative action. Id. (citing Foster, 27 U.S. at 315).  However, the Court changed 
its holding four years later due to the less legislative Spanish-language version of the treaty at 
issue. Id. 
230. Id. at 1380. 
231. Id. at 1380-81. 
232. Id. at 1381.  To clarify these national differences, the dissent used Britain’s approach to 
treaty implementation, which almost always required parliamentary legislation before a treaty 
could be domestically enforced. Id.  On the contrary, the practice in the Netherlands was to di-
rectly incorporate treaties concluded by the Executive without explicit parliamentary approval of 
the treaty. Id. 
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in a treaty’s language as to self-execution was irrelevant to the question of 
whether a treaty was in fact self-executing.233 
The dissent further stated that examining the text and history of a 
treaty, together with its subject matter and related characteristics, is the cor-
rect approach to determine whether the treaty provision addresses itself to 
the political branches, contemplating further action, or to the judicial 
branch, contemplating direct enforcement.234  Applying the practical, con-
text-specific approach mentioned above, the dissent determined the relevant 
treaty provisions in Medellín to be self-executing as applied to the ICJ 
judgment in Avena.235  The dissent noted that the language of the relevant 
treaties supported a finding of direct judicial enforceability.236  In addition, 
the Optional Protocol applied to disputes arising out of the Vienna Conven-
tion, which was itself self-executing and judicially enforceable.237  The dis-
sent further stated that the treaty provision providing for binding and final 
judgments for treaty-based settlement disputes was logically self-executing, 
because the judgment’s underlying treaty provision was itself self-
executing.238  Finally, according to the dissent, the majority’s approach had 
serious negative practical implications for the United States, which submit-
ted itself to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in more than seventy 
treaties.239 Thus, if in Medellín the Optional Protocol, the U.N. Charter, and 
the ICJ Statute, were insufficient to warrant enforcement of the ICJ judg-
ment, it would be difficult to see how a different result could be reached as 
to those other treaties.240 
Moreover, the dissent stated that the majority could not look to Con-
gress for a “quick fix.”241  The dissent noted that Congress was unlikely to 
authorize the automatic enforcement of all ICJ judgments, given the possi-
bility that some of these judgments might contain sensitive political issues 
 
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 1382 (citing Foster, 27 U.S. at 314). 
235. Id. at 1382-83. 
236. Id. at 1382.  The dissent noted that the language of Article 94(1) of the U.N. Charter 
providing that each member “undertakes to comply with the decision” of the ICJ, together with 
the ICJ Statute’s provision stating that such a decision had binding force between parties who 
have submitted themselves to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, clearly indicated the neces-
sity for judicial activity. Id. 
237. Id. at 1385.  The dissent stated that because the provision involved an individual’s right 
to be informed of his or her separate right to contact his or her nation’s consul and because such a 
right was intertwined with the rules of criminal procedure, the provision contained judicially en-
forceable standards. Id. 
238. Id. at 1386. 
239. Id. at 1387. 
240. Id. at 1387-88. 
241. Id. at 1388. 
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better suited for the other branches.242  Avena called for the review and 
reconsideration of the possible prejudice caused to the fifty-one Mexican 
nationals as a result of the Vienna Convention violation.243  Such a call re-
quired an understanding of criminal law and procedure.244 Therefore, it was 
the judiciary, not the legislature, that was best-suited for the task.245  The 
dissent emphasized that a finding that the United States’ treaty obligation 
was self-executing and Avena enforceable would not create a constitutional 
conflict with the other branches.246  The fact that neither the President nor 
Congress have expressed any concern about the direct judicial enforcement 
of the ICJ judgment in Avena supported such a statement.247  The dissent 
concluded that the ICJ judgment in Avena was judicially enforceable in 
domestic courts without the need for implementing legislative action.248 
Finding the Avena judgment binding, the dissent next turned to the 
question of what would constitute a proper review and reconsideration of 
the state convictions and sentences of the fifty-one Mexican nationals.249  
The dissent stated that the proper course of action for the Supreme Court in 
Medellín would be to remand the case, making Texas’ state courts the 
proper forum for review and reconsideration.250  The dissent further noted 
that state review was proper because both the crime and the prosecution at 
issue took place in Texas.251  Therefore, the ICJ judgment in Avena required 
Texas to consider whether the failure to inform Medellín of his Vienna 
Convention rights caused Medellín actual prejudice, notwithstanding state 
procedural default rules barring such consideration.252  Finally, because 
Texas law authorizes a criminal defendant to seek post-judgment review 
where the law provides a legal basis that was previously unavailable, the 
dissent stated the case should have been remanded for reconsideration to the 
Texas state courts, directing them to apply Avena as binding law.253  Having 
reached the conclusion Avena constituted binding domestic law, the dissent 
did not focus on whether the President had the constitutional authority to 
 
242. Id.  The dissent noted military hostility, naval activity, and the handling of nuclear wea-
pons as likely politically sensitive judgments. Id. 
243. Id. (citing Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. V. U.S.), 2004 
I.C.J. 12, 65 (Mar. 31)). 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 1389. 
248. Id.  
249. Id. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. at 1390. 
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enforce Avena.254  In the last part of its opinion, however, the dissent ad-
dressed the majority’s holding that the President may not rely upon a non-
self-executing treaty to establish binding rules of decision that preempt 
contrary state law.255 
2. The President’s Memorandum 
The dissent noted that the President’s Memorandum was an attempt on 
the part of the Executive to implement treaty provisions, in which the 
United States agreed the ICJ judgment was binding with respect to 
Avena.256  According to the dissent, the President acted pursuant to his con-
stitutional authority in the area of foreign affairs in issuing the memoran-
dum.257  Therefore, his acts fell within the second category of Justice Jack-
son’s Youngstown framework, in which the President acts where Congress 
has neither explicitly authorized nor prohibited the act in question. 258 
The dissent noted that if the President had the constitutional authority 
in the area of foreign affairs to act with respect to Avena, then the issuance 
of the Memorandum would require setting aside state procedural law.259  
The dissent stated that past Court decisions have upheld the President’s au-
thority to make and implement executive agreements with respect to inter-
national obligations and to assert principles of foreign sovereign immunity, 
even where such authority could require state law to be set aside.260  How-
ever, the dissent did not reach a conclusion on the constitutional balance 
among state and federal or executive and legislative power in the area of 
foreign affairs.261  The dissent noted it lacked the judicial expertise in deter-
mining the scope of presidential authority to implement treaty provisions 
contrary to state law.262  Such determination, the dissent stated, was best left 
in “the constitutional shade from which it has emerged.”263 
 
254. Id. 
255. See discussion infra Part III.A.2 (stating that in the absence of implementing legislation, 
a non-self-executing treaty does not give the President the authority to create binding rules of de-
cision that preempt contrary state law). 
256. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1390.  
257. Id. 
258. Id. (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring)). 
259. Id. 
260. Id. at 1390-91 (citing Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943) and United States v. 
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942)). 
261. Id. at 1391.  
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
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IV. IMPACT 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas drew a great deal 
of domestic and international attention.264  Supporters of the decision com-
mended the ruling,265 while opponents urged Congress to act immediately 
and implement the Avena judgment.266  The United States Supreme Court, 
however, reaffirmed the holding of Medellín only a few months after the 
initial opinion by denying Medellín’s petition for writ of certiorari and mo-
tion for stay of execution.267  At the same time, Congress reacted to Me-
dellín by attempting to provide the requisite legislative approval for imple-
menting Avena.268  Throughout these judicial and legislative developments, 
legal scholars continued to debate the impact of Medellín, the effect of the 
decision on the interpretation and implementation of international treaty 
obligations, and the questions the Supreme Court left unanswered in Me-
dellín v. Texas.269 
A. SUBSEQUENT HISTORY 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas, Medellín 
filed a subsequent application for writ of habeas corpus and a motion for 
 
264. See Robert Greffenius, Selling Medellín:  The Entourage of Litigation Surrounding The 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Weight of International Court of Justice Opi-
nions in the Domestic Sphere, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 943, 946 (2008) (arguing the Supreme 
Court in Medellín failed to establish a test for analyzing binding decisions of international tribun-
als such as the ICJ); but see Noah Feldman, When Judges Make Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE, Sept. 28, 2008, at 50 (stating the case generated little public attention, although in its 
own way it was instrumental in defining the United States’ constitutional era).  As of November 
2009, only two opinions had cited to the Supreme Court decision in Medellín v. Texas. See e.g., In 
re Martinez, 209 P.3d 908 (Cal. 2009).   Legal scholars, however, continued to write about the 
significance of the case and the future of treaty obligations following the Medellín decision. See, 
e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 118 YALE 
L.J. 1762 (2009). 
265. James C. McKinley Jr., Texas Executes Mexican Despite Objections, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
6, 2008, available at http://www nytimes.com (search title, then click title hyperlink). 
266. See Frederic L. Kirgis, International Law in the American Courts—the United States 
Supreme Court Declines to Enforce the I.C.J.’s Avena Judgment Relating to a U.S. Obligation 
Under the Convention on Consular Relations, 9 GERMAN L.J. 619, 634-35 (2008) (explaining the 
possible steps Mexico might take in response to the United States’ refusal to provide review and 
reconsideration for Medellín’s conviction and sentence); see also The StandDown Texas Project, 
Today’s Medellín Coverage, http://www.standdown.typepad.com/weblog/2008/08/todays-medel 
lin html (last visited on Nov. 21, 2009) (statement of Sandra Babcock, counsel for Medellín) 
(stating that if Texas proceeds with the execution, the United States will find itself in breach of its 
international obligations). 
267. See discussion infra Part IV.A (analyzing the Supreme Court’s denial of Medellín’s 
petition for writ of certiorari and motion for stay of execution). 
268. See discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing Congress’ proposed legislation regarding the 
ICJ judgment in Avena). 
269. See discussion infra Parts IV.C, IV.D (examining the effect of Medellín on United 
States-Mexico relations and addressing some of the questions raised by the decision). 
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stay of execution.270  After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed 
the application, Medellín filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the 
United States Supreme Court.271  In denying Medellín’s motion for stay of 
execution, the Supreme Court held that the possibility of either Congress or 
the state legislature determining Medellín’s sentence should be vacated be-
cause of Avena was too remote to warrant stay of execution.272  The Court 
reiterated its position that when treaties are non-self-executing, treaty obli-
gations undertaken by the United States can become binding domestic law 
only through implementing legislation.273 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens stated that the stay of execu-
tion should have been granted because the harm of refusing to respect the 
ICJ judgment outweighed a short delay in imposing the sentence.274  Justice 
Souter, in a separate dissent, noted that he would grant the petition to allow 
for the views of the Solicitor General to be considered and for any congres-
sional action that might affect the disposition of the case to be taken.275  In 
his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer determined that the issue before the 
Court was whether the United States would carry out its international legal 
obligations to enforce the ICJ judgment in Avena.276  Granting the stay of 
execution, Justice Breyer asserted, would prevent the Court from placing 
the nation in violation of international law.277  However, on August 6, 2008, 
shortly after the Supreme Court denied Medellín’s motion, Medellín was 
executed by lethal injection.278  The Governor of Texas, Mr. Rick Perry, re-
jected requests from Mexico, the State Department, and the White House to 
delay the execution, stating that the nature of Medellín’s crimes were just 
cause for the death penalty.279 
B. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES 
On July 14, 2008, members of the United States House of Representa-
tives introduced the “Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008,” seeking to 
provide the legislative approval necessary to implement the ICJ judgment in 
 
270. Medellín v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 360, 361 (2008) (per curium). 
271. Id. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. 
274. Id. at 362 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
275. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg filed a separate dissent inviting, similarly 
to Justice Souter, the views of the Solicitor General on the current matter.  Id. at 363 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
276. Id. at 363 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
277. Id. at 364.  
278. McKinley, supra note 265, at 1. 
279. Id. 
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Avena.280  The introduction of the bill was partly the result of requests made 
by United States Attorney General Michael Mukasey, Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice, and past and present presidents of the American Society 
of International Law.281  All urged Congress to take legislative action and 
resolve the treaty dispute between Mexico and the United States over the 
convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals named in Avena, in-
cluding Medellín.282  The legislation, as proposed, would empower federal 
courts to hear the Vienna Convention claims of foreign nationals who were 
not advised of their right to consular notification.283  Furthermore, the 
United States’ government informed the International Court of Justice that 
it would take further steps to give effect to the convictions and sentences of 
the Mexican nationals named in the Avena judgment.284  The legislation 
was referred to the House Judiciary Committee for consideration, but no 
further developments have been reported.285  Thus, in the absence of clear 
congressional response to Avena, some international commentators sug-
gested other possible ways in which Mexico could seek remedies.286 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES-MEXICO RELATIONS 
Mexico has two primary options for remedies.287  First, Mexico could 
invoke Article 60(2)(b) of the Vienna Convention.288  Article 60(2)(b) pro-
vides that as a party affected by a material breach of a multilateral treaty, 
Mexico could suspend the operation of the treaty, in whole or in part, in its 
 
280. Medellín, 129 S. Ct. at 361 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  See also Diane Jennings, Federal 
Officials Try to Block Texas Execution to Allow World Court Review of Case, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, July 28, 2008, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2009) (stat-
ing that Representatives Howard Bernan and Zoe Lofgren of California introduced a bill in Con-
gress to require the state to comply with the Avena judgment of the ICJ). 
281. See The StandDown Texas Project, supra note 266 (discussing the proposed legislation 
regarding Avena); see also Marcia Coyle, Attorneys Urge Congressional Leaders to Address Issue 
of Mexican Nationals on Death Row, NAT’L L.J., July 24, 2008, available at http://www.law. 
com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202423200889&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 (discussing the im-
portance of congressional action and the importance of such action for ensuring the protection of 
American citizens abroad). 
282. See Coyle, supra note 281 (stating that attorneys are asking Congress to take action 
regarding Medellín’s sentence). 
283. See The StandDown Texas Project, Medellín & Congressional Legislation, http://stand 
down.typepad.com/weblog/federal_legislation/ (July 30, 2008) (discussing the language of the 
Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008). 
284. Medellín, 129 S. Ct. at 362 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Request for Interpretation of 
the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals 
(Mex. v. U.S.), 2008 I.C.J. ¶ 37 (Order of July 16)). 
285. Id. at 361. 
286. Kirgis, supra note 266, at 633. 
287. Id. 
288. Id. at 633 (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60(2)(b), May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331). 
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relations to the United States.289  Mexico most likely would be unsuccessful 
in pursuing this course of action, however, because Mexico would be una-
ble to show that the Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín rose to the level 
of material breach required by the Vienna Convention.290  Second, custo-
mary international law provides that a State injured by an intentionally 
wrongful act of another State, such as breach of treaty obligations, may take 
proportional countermeasures against that State.291  Thus, Mexico might 
choose to disregard Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations when United States nationals are arrested and detained by Mex-
ican authorities.292  Moreover, customary international law permits States, 
other than the injured State, to take countermeasures in response to viola-
tions of international treaties.293  Non-injured States may take counter-
measures where the violation amounts to a breach of duty owed to a group 
of States or the international community as a whole.294  Thus, similarly to 
Mexico, other States may choose to deny the right to consular notification 
to United States nationals arrested and detained on their territories.295  The 
effect of Medellín on the relationship between the United States and Mexico 
remains unclear and represents only one of many questions the United 
States Supreme Court failed to address in Medellín.296 
D. THE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
Medellín v. Texas left commentators wondering about the future of in-
ternational treaty obligations.297  The decision has raised new doubts about 
whether other United States treaty obligations are binding as domestic 
law.298  Some commentators have suggested that one possible way of 
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eliminating the doubt created by Medellín would be to enact international 
agreements as congressional-executive agreements.299  Others argue that the 
Constitution presumes treaties to be self-executing and suggest that a de-
fault rule of self-execution be established.300  Such a rule, commentators 
assert, will be consistent with both the text of the Constitution and the 
structure and precedent of the Supreme Court.301  Furthermore, a default 
rule of self-execution will enable treaty-makers to control the domestic con-
sequences of treaties.302 
In addition, the question of how United States courts should consider 
ICJ judgments in the future, when these judgments are rendered in accor-
dance with self-executing or congressionally implemented treaties, remains 
undecided.303  The standard for determining whether a treaty is self-execut-
ing or whether congressional action is necessary for its implementation is 
unclear as well.304  Finally, the Supreme Court failed to address the subject 
of federalism within the context of international treaty obligations and left 
unanswered the question of whether the federal government may mandate 
states to comply with the government’s international obligations.305  Thus, 
while legal scholars responded quickly to some of the issues raised by 
Medellín in the months following the decision, commentators are likely to 
continue the debate on the significance of Medellín v. Texas and its future 
effect on the interpretation and implementation of the United States’ treaty 
obligations.306 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In Medellín v. Texas, the Supreme Court ruled on the judgment of the 
ICJ in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals and the Presi-
dent’s Memorandum attempting to implement that decision as domestic 
law.307  The Court found that while Avena created an international obliga-
tion on the part of the United States, the treaties underlying the judgment 
were non-self-executing and, in the absence of implementing legislation, 
did not constitute binding federal law that preempted state procedural de-
fault rules.308  The Court further held that because the Executive did not 
have the authority to unilaterally execute an international judgment, the 
President’s Memorandum did not make the ICJ Avena judgment binding on 
state courts.309 
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